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Abstract. This paper deals with runtime enforcement of untimed and timed
properties with uncontrollable events. Runtime enforcement consists in modi-
fying the executions of a running system to ensure their correctness with respect
to a desired property. We introduce a framework that takes as input any regu-
lar (timed) property over an alphabet of events, with some of these events being
uncontrollable. An uncontrollable event cannot be delayed nor intercepted by an
enforcement mechanism. Enforcement mechanisms satisfy important properties,
namely soundness and compliance - meaning that enforcement mechanisms out-
put correct executions that are close to the input execution. We discuss the condi-
tions for a property to be enforceable with uncontrollable events, and we define
enforcement mechanisms that modify executions to obtain a correct output, as
soon as possible. Moreover, we synthesize sound and compliant descriptions of
runtime enforcement mechanisms at two levels of abstraction to facilitate their
design and implementation.
1 Introduction
Verifying a user-provided specification at runtime consists in running a mechanism that
assigns verdicts to a sequence of events produced by an instrumented system w.r.t.
a property formalizing the specification. This paper focuses on runtime enforcement
(cf. [21,15,12,13,3]) which goes beyond pure verification at runtime and studies how to
react to a violation of specifications. In runtime enforcement, an enforcement mecha-
nism (EM) takes a (possibly incorrect) execution sequence as input, and outputs a new
sequence. Enforcement mechanisms should be sound and transparent, meaning that the
output should satisfy the property under consideration and should be as close as possi-
ble to the input. When dealing with timed properties, EMs can act as delayers over the
input sequence of events [19,17,18]. That is, EMs buffer input events for some time and
then release them in such a way that the output sequence of events satisfies the property.
Motivations. In this paper, we focus on online enforcement of properties with uncon-
trollable events. Introducing uncontrollable events is a step towards more realistic run-
time enforcement. As a matter of fact, uncontrollable events naturally occur in many
applications scenarios where the EM has no control over certain input events. For in-
stance, certain events from the environment may be out of the scope of the mechanism
at hand. This situation arises for instance in avionic systems where a command of the
pilot has consequences on a specific component. In this domain, it is usual to add control
mechanisms to check the validity of an event on particular points according to observa-
tions. For instance, the “spoiler activation”5 command decided by the pilot is sent by the
panel to a control flight system, and this leads finally to a specific event on the spoilers.
Placing an EM directly on the spoiler permits to avoid incoherent events, according to
the pilot commands (which are events out of the scope of the EM). In the timed setting,
uncontrollable events may be urgent messages that cannot be delayed by an enforce-
ment mechanism. Similarly, when a data-dependency exists between two events (e.g.,
between a write event that displays a value obtained from a previous read event), the
first read event is somehow uncontrollable as it cannot be delayed by the enforcement
mechanism without preventing the write event to occur in the monitored program.
Challenges. Considering uncontrollable events in the timed setting induces new chal-
lenges. Indeed, enforcement mechanisms may now receive events that cannot be buffered
and have to be released immediately in output. Since they influence the satisfaction of
the property under scrutiny, delays of controllable events stored in memory have to be
recomputed upon each uncontrollable event. Moreover, the occurrence of such events
has to be anticipated, meaning that all possible sequences of uncontrollable events have
to be considered by the enforcement mechanism. Thus, new enforcement strategies are
necessary for both untimed and timed properties.
Contributions. We introduce a framework for runtime enforcement of regular untimed
and timed properties with uncontrollable events. It turns out that the usual notion of
transparency has to be weakened. As we shall see, the initial order between uncon-
trollable and controllable events can change in output, contrary to what is prescribed
by transparency. Thus, we propose to replace transparency with a new notion, namely
compliance, ensuring that the order of controllable events is maintained while uncon-
trollable events are output as soon as they are received. We define a property to be
enforceable with uncontrollable events when it is possible to obtain a sound and com-
pliant enforcement mechanism for any input sequence. It turns out that a property may
not be enforceable because of certain input sequences. Intuitively, enforceability issues
arise because some sequences of uncontrollable events that lead the property to be vio-
lated cannot be avoided. We give a condition, represented by a property, that indicates
whether soundness is guaranteed by the enforcement monitor or not, depending on the
input given so far. We describe enforcement mechanisms at two levels of abstraction.
The synthesized enforcement mechanisms are sound and compliant whenever the pre-
viously mentioned condition holds.
Outline. Section 2 introduces preliminaries and notations. Sections 3 and 4 present the
enforcement framework with uncontrollable events in the untimed and timed settings,
respectively, where enforcement mechanisms are defined at two levels of abstraction.
Section 5 discusses related work. Section 6 presents conclusions and perspectives.
5 The spoiler is a device used to reduce the lift of an aircraft.
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2 Preliminaries and Notation
Untimed notions. An alphabet is a finite set of symbols. A word over an alphabet Σ is
a sequence over Σ. The set of finite words over Σ is denoted Σ∗. The length of a finite
wordw is noted |w|, and the empty word is noted .Σ+ stands forΣ∗\{}. A language
over Σ is any subset L ⊆ Σ∗. The concatenation of two words w and w′ is noted w.w′
(the dot could sometimes be omitted). A word w′ is a prefix of a word w, noted w′ 4 w
if there exists a word w′′ such that w = w′.w′′. The word w′′ is called the residual of
w after reading the prefix w′, noted w′′ = w′−1.w. The word w′′ is then called a suffix
of w. Note that w′.w′′ = w′.w′−1.w = w. These standard definitions are extended to
languages in the natural way. Given a word w and an integer i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ |w|,
we note w(i) the i-th element of w. Given a tuple e = (e1, e2, . . . , en) of size n, for
an integer i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we note Πi the projection on the i-th coordinate, i.e.
Πi(e) = ei. Given a word w ∈ Σ∗ and Σ′ ⊆ Σ, we define the restriction of w to
Σ′, noted w|Σ′ , as the word w′ ∈ Σ′ whose letters are the letters of w belonging to Σ′
in the same order. Formally, |Σ′ =  and ∀σ ∈ Σ∗,∀a ∈ Σ, (w.a)|Σ′ = w|Σ′ .a if
a ∈ Σ′, and (w.a)|Σ′ = w|Σ′ otherwise.
Automata. An automaton is a tuple 〈Q, q0, Σ,−→, F 〉, where Q is the set of states,
called locations, q0 ∈ Q is the initial location, Σ is the alphabet, −→⊆ Q × Σ × Q is
the transition relation and F ⊆ Q is the set of accepting locations. Any location in F
is called accepting. Whenever there exists (q, a, q′) ∈−→, we note it q a−→ q′. Relation
−→ is extended to words σ ∈ Σ∗ by noting q σ.a−−→ q′ whenever there exists q′′ such
that q σ−→ q′′ and q′′ a−→ q′. Moreover, for q ∈ Q, q −→ q always holds. An automaton
A = 〈Q, q0, Σ,−→, F 〉 is deterministic if ∀q ∈ Q,∀a ∈ Σ, (q a−→ q′ ∧ q a−→ q′′) =⇒
q′ = q′′. A is complete if ∀q ∈ Q,∀a ∈ Σ,∃q′ ∈ Q, q a−→ q′. A word w is accepted by
A if there exists q ∈ F such that q0 w−→ q. The language (i.e. set of all words) accepted
by A is noted L(A). A property is a language over an alphabet Σ. A regular property
is a language accepted by an automaton. In the sequel, we shall assume that a property
ϕ is represented by a deterministic and complete automaton Aϕ.
Timed languages. Let R≥0 be the set of non-negative real numbers, and Σ a finite al-
phabet of actions. An event is a pair (t, a) ∈ R≥0 × Σ. We define date(t, a) = t and
act(t, a) = a the projections of events on dates and actions respectively. A timed word
over Σ is a word over R≥0 × Σ whose real parts are ascending, i.e. σ is a timed word
if σ ∈ (R≥0 × Σ)∗ and ∀i ∈ [1; |σ| − 1],date(w(i)) ≤ date(w(i + 1)). tw(Σ) de-
notes the set of timed words over Σ. For a timed word σ = (t1, a1).(t2, a2) . . . (tn, an)
and an integer i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ |σ|, ti is the time elapsed before action ai oc-
curs. We naturally extend the notions of prefix and residual to timed words. We note
time(σ) = date(σ(|σ|)), and define the observation of σ at time t as the timed word
obs(σ, t) = max4({σ′ | σ′ 4 σ ∧ time(σ′) ≤ t}). We also define the remainder
of the observation of σ at time t as nobs(σ, t) = (obs(σ, t))−1.σ. The untimed pro-
jection of σ is ΠΣ(σ) = a1.a2 . . . an, it is the sequence of actions of σ with dates
ignored. σ delayed by t ∈ R≥0 is the word noted σ+t t such that t is added to all dates:
σ+t t = (t1+ t, a1).(t2+ t, a2) . . . (t|σ|+ t, a|σ|). We also extend the definition of the
restriction of σ to Σ′ ⊆ Σ to timed words, such that |Σ′ = , and for σ ∈ tw(Σ)
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and (t, a) such that σ.(t, a) ∈ tw(Σ), (σ.(t, a))|Σ′ = σ|Σ′ .(t, a) if a ∈ Σ′, and
(σ.(t, a))|Σ′ = σ|Σ′ otherwise. A timed language is any subset of tw(Σ). Moreover,
we define an order on timed words: we say that σ′ delays σ, noted σ 4d σ′, whenever
ΠΣ(σ
′) 4 ΠΣ(σ) and ∀i ∈ [1; |σ| − 1],date(σ(i)) ≤ date(σ′(i)). Note that the order
is not the same in the different constraints: σ′ is a prefix of σ, but dates in σ′ exceed
dates in σ. We also define a lexical order 4lex on timed words with identical untimed
projections, such that 4lex , and for two words σ and σ′ such that ΠΣ(σ) = ΠΣ(σ′),
and two events (t, a) and (t′, a), (t′, a).σ′4lex(t, a).σ if t′ < t ∨ (t = t′ ∧ σ′4lex σ).
Consider for example the timed word σ = (1, a).(2, b).(3, c).(4, a) over the alpha-
betΣ = {a, b, c}. Then,ΠΣ(σ) = a.b.c.a, obs(σ, 3) = (1, a).(2, b).(3, c), nobs(σ, 3) =
(4, a), and ifΣ′ = {b, c}, σ|Σ′ = (2, b).(3, c), and for instance σ 4d (1, a).(2, b).(4, c),
and σ4lex(1, a).(3, b).(3, c).(3, a).
Timed automata. Let X = {X1, X2, . . . , Xn} be a finite set of clocks. A clock valua-
tion is a function ν fromX toR≥0. The set of clock valuations for the set of clocksX is
noted V(X), i.e., V(X) = {ν | ν : X → R≥0}. We consider the following operations
on valuations: for any valuation ν, ν + δ is the valuation assigning ν(Xi) + δ to every
clock Xi ∈ X; for any subset X ′ ⊆ X , ν[X ′ ← 0] is the valuation assigning 0 to
each clock in X ′, and ν(Xi) to any other clock Xi not in X ′. G(X) denotes the set of
guards consisting of boolean combinations of simple constraints of the form Xi ./ c
with Xi ∈ X , c ∈ N, and ./∈ {<,≤,=,≥, >}. Given g ∈ G(X) and a valuation ν, we
write ν |= g when for every simple constraint Xi ./ c in g, ν(Xi) ./ c ≡ true .
Definition 1 (Timed automaton [1]). A timed automaton (TA) is a tupleA = 〈L, l0, X,
Σ, ∆,G〉, such that L is a set of locations, l0 ∈ L is the initial location, X is a set of
clocks, Σ is a finite set of events, ∆ ⊆ L × G(X) × Σ × 2X × L is the transition
relation, and G ⊆ L is a set of accepting locations. A transition (l, g, a,X ′, l′) ∈ ∆
is a transition from l to l′, labelled with event a, with guard defined by g, and with the
clocks in X ′ to be reset.
The semantics of a timed automatonA is a timed transition system JAK = 〈Q, q0, Γ,
→, FG〉 where Q = L × V(X) is the (infinite) set of states, q0 = (l0, ν0) is the initial
state, with ν0 = ν[X ← 0], FG = G × V(X) is the set of accepting states, Γ =
R≥0×Σ is the set of transition labels, each one composed of a delay and an action. The
transition relation→⊆ Q×Γ ×Q is a set of transitions of the form (l, ν) (δ,a)−−−→ (l′, ν′)
with ν′ = (ν + δ)[Y ← 0] whenever there is a transition (l, g, a, Y, l′) ∈ ∆ such that
ν + δ |= g, for δ ≥ 0.
A timed automaton A = 〈L, l0, X,Σ,∆,G〉 is deterministic if for any (l, g1, a, Y1, l′1)
and (l, g2, a, Y2, l′2) in ∆, g1 ∧ g2 is unsatisfiable, meaning that only one transition can
be fired at any time. A is complete if for any l ∈ L and any a ∈ Σ, the disjunction of
the guards of all the transitions leaving l and labeled by a is valid (i.e., it evaluates to
true for any clock valuation).
A run ρ from q ∈ Q is a valid sequence of transitions in JAK starting from q,
of the form ρ = q
(δ1,a1)−−−−→ q1 (δ2,a2)−−−−→ q2 . . . (δn,an)−−−−−→ qn. The set of runs from
q0 is noted Run(A) and RunFG(A) denotes the subset of runs accepted by A, i.e.
ending in a state in FG. The trace of the run ρ previously defined is the timed word
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l0 l1
l3
l2
Auth
Auth
LockOff
Write
LockOn
Auth
LockOn
LockOff
Write
LockOn
LockOff
Write
Σ
(a) Property ϕex modeling writings on a shared
storage device
l0 l1
l3
l2
Auth
Auth
LockOff
Write
LockOn
Auth
LockOff
Write
LockOn
Write
LockOn
LockOff
Σ
(b) Pre(ϕex)
Fig. 1: A property and its corresponding precondition property of enforceability
(t1, a1).(t2, a2) . . . (tn, an), with, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ti =
∑i
k=1 δk. Thus, given the trace
σ = (t1, a1).(t2, a2) . . . (tn, an) of a run ρ from a state q ∈ Q to q′ ∈ Q, we can
define w = (δ1, a1).(δ2, a2) . . . (δn, an), with δ1 = t1, and ∀i ∈ [2;n], δi = ti − ti−1,
and then q w−→ q′. To ease the notation, we will only consider traces and note q σ−→ q′
whenever q w−→ q′ for the previously defined w. Note that to concatenate two traces σ1
and σ2, it is needed to delay σ2: the concatenation σ of σ1 and σ2 is the trace defined
as σ = σ1.(σ2+t time(σ1)). Thus, if q
σ1−→ q′ σ2−→ q′′, then q σ−→ q′′.
Timed properties. A regular timed property is a timed language ϕ ⊆ tw(Σ) that is
accepted by a timed automaton. For a timed word σ, we say that σ satisfies ϕ, noted σ |=
ϕ whenever σ ∈ ϕ. A regular timed property is a timed language accepted by a timed
automaton. We only consider deterministic and complete regular timed properties.
Given an automaton A such that Q is the set of states of JAK and −→ its transition
relation, and a word σ, we note q afterσ = {q′ ∈ Q | q σ−→ q′} for q ∈ Q. We note
Reach(σ) = q0 afterσ. These definitions are valid in both the untimed and timed cases.
We extend these definitions to languages: ifL is a language, q afterL =
⋃
σ∈L q afterσ
and Reach(L) = q0 afterL.
3 Enforcement Monitoring of Untimed Properties
In this section, ϕ is a regular property defined by a complete and deterministic automa-
ton Aϕ = 〈Q, q0, Σ,−→, F 〉. The purpose of an enforcement mechanism (EM) for ϕ is
to modify the executions of a running system, represented by words so as to satisfy ϕ. It
takes as input a word, representing an execution, and outputs a word, i.e. an execution.
We consider uncontrollable events in the set Σu ⊆ Σ. These events cannot be modi-
fied by the EM, i.e. they cannot be suppressed nor buffered, so they must be emitted
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by the EM whenever they are received. Let us note Σc = Σ \ Σu the set of control-
lable events, which are on the scope of the EM. The EM can decide to buffer them to
delay their emission, but it cannot suppress them (nevertheless, it can delay them end-
lessly, keeping their order unchanged). Thus, the EM may interleave controllable and
uncontrollable events.
3.1 Enforcement Functions and their Requirements
An enforcement function is a description of the input/output behavior of an EM. For-
mally, we define enforcement functions as follows:
Definition 2 (Enforcement function). Given an alphabet of actions Σ, an enforce-
ment function is a function E : Σ∗ → Σ∗, i.e. a function that modifies an execution.
As stated previously, the usual purpose of an EM is to ensure that the executions of
a running system satisfy a property, thus its enforcement function has to be sound,
meaning that its output always satisfies the property:
Definition 3 (Soundness). E is sound with respect to ϕ if ∀σ ∈ Σ∗, E(σ) |= ϕ.
The usual notion of transparency in enforcement monitoring [21,15] states that the out-
put of an enforcement function is the longest prefix of the input satisfying the property.
The name “transparency” stems from the fact that correct executions are left unchanged.
However, because of uncontrollable events, events may be released in a different order
from the one they are received. Therefore, transparency can not be ensured, and we
define the weaker notion of compliance.
Definition 4 (Compliance).E is compliant w.r.t.Σu andΣc, noted compliant(E, Σc,
Σu), if ∀σ ∈ Σ∗, E(σ)|Σc 4 σ|Σc ∧ ∀u ∈ Σu, E(σ).u 4 E(σ.u).
Intuitively, compliance states that the EM does not change the order of the controllable
events and emits uncontrollable events immediately upon their reception, possibly fol-
lowed by stored controllable events. When clear from the context, the partition is not
mentioned: E is said to be compliant.
We say that a property is enforceable whenever there exists a compliant function
that is sound with respect to that property.
Example 1. Figure 1a depicts property ϕex which states that writing to a shared storage
device should be authenticated and is authorized only when the device is not locked.
ϕex is not enforceable if the uncontrollable alphabet is {LockOn,LockOff}6 since
reading the word LockOn from l0 leads to l3, which is not an accepting location. How-
ever, the existence of such a word does not imply that it is impossible to enforce this
property for some other input words. If word Auth is read, then location l1 is reached,
and from this location, it is possible to enforce ϕex by emitting Write only when in
location l1.
6 Uncontrollable events are emphasized in italics.
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3.2 Synthesizing Enforcement Functions
Example 1 shows that some input words cannot be corrected by the EM, because of un-
controllable events. This leads us to define another property that captures the sequences
that can be input to an EM while ensuring soundness.
Definition 5 (Pre,Enf).
– Pre(ϕ) = 〈Q, q0, Σ,−→′,Qenf〉, with
−→′= (−→ ∩Qenf ×Σ ×Q) ∪ {(q, a, q) | q ∈ Qenf ∧a ∈ Σ}
– Enf(ϕ) = 〈Q, q0, Σ,−→,Qenf〉.
where Qenf = {q ∈ F | (q afterΣ∗u) ⊆ F}, Qenf = Q \Qenf .
Qenf is the set of accepting locations of Aϕ from which it is impossible to reach a non-
accepting location by reading only uncontrollable events, and thus possible to enforce
the property (since it is possible to indefinitely delay all controllable events to ensure
the property).
Intuitively, Pre(ϕ) is the property specifying whether it is possible to enforce ϕ
from a location that has already been reached by triggering the output sequence of the
enforcement mechanism (i.e. a location reached by a prefix of the output) or not. Thus,
it can be used to know if soundness is guaranteed or not (i.e. if a location from Qenf has
been reached). Since the enforcement mechanism ensures that soundness is satisfied as
soon as possible, Pre(ϕ) is a co-safety property, because once Qenf is reached, ϕ can
be ensured from then.
Example 2. For property ϕex, Qenf = {l1, l2}, and Pre(ϕex) is the property repre-
sented by the automaton in Fig. 1b.
Since it is not possible to enforce ϕ from locations in Q \ Qenf , (because uncontrol-
lable events could lead to a location in Q \ F trapped with uncontrollable events), an
enforcement function should try to always be able to reach locations in Qenf to ensure
soundness. Thus, property Enf(ϕ) holds on a sequence whenever Qenf is reached in
Aϕ with this sequence. Since Qenf ⊆ F , satisfying Enf(ϕ) is sufficient to satisfy ϕ.
Thus, we shall enforce Enf(ϕ).
Based on the above definition and the enforcement limitation illustrated in Exam-
ple 1, we synthesise an enforcement function for ϕ that is compliant, and sound w.r.t. a
property that is as close as possible to ϕ (see later Propositions 1 and 2).
Definition 6 (storeϕ, Eϕ). 7 Function storeϕ : Σ∗ → Σ∗ ×Σ∗ is defined as follows:
– storeϕ() = (, );
– for σ ∈ Σ∗ and a ∈ Σ, let (σs, σc) = storeϕ(σ), then:
storeϕ(σ.a) =
{
(σs.a.σ
′
s, σ
′
c) if a ∈ Σu
(σs.σ
′′
s , σ
′′
c ) if a ∈ Σc , where:
σ′s = max4({w 4 σc | σs.a.w |= Enf(ϕ)}),
7 Eϕ and storeϕ depend onΣu andΣc, but we did not add them in order to lighten the notations.
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σ′c = σ
′−1
s .σc,
σ′′s =
{
 if σs.σc.a 6|= Enf(ϕ),
σc.a otherwise,
σ′′c = σ
′′−1
s .(σc.a).
The enforcement function Eϕ : Σ∗ → Σ∗ is s.t. for σ ∈ Σ∗, Eϕ(σ) = Π1(storeϕ(σ)).
Intuitively, σs is the word that can be released as output, whereas σc is the buffer con-
taining the events that are already read/received, but cannot be released as output yet
because they lead to an unsafe location from which it would be possible to violate the
property reading only uncontrollable events. If σs satisfies Pre(ϕ), then the output will
always satisfy the property afterwards.
Upon receiving a new action a, it is output if it belongs to Σu, followed by the
longest prefix of σc that leads to Qenf . If the a is controllable, σc.a is output if it leads
to Qenf , else a is added to the buffer. Property Enf(ϕ) is used instead of ϕ to ensure
that the output of the enforcement function always leads to locations in Qenf , so that
the property will still be satisfied (if it was) upon receiving uncontrollable events.
Enforcement functions as per Definition 6 are sound and compliant.
Proposition 1. Eϕ is sound with respect to Pre(ϕ) =⇒ ϕ, as per Definition 3.
Proposition 2. Eϕ is compliant, as per Definition 4.
Notice that for some properties, blocking all controllable events may still satisfy sound-
ness and compliance. However, for any given input σ, Eϕ(σ) is the longest possible
word that ensures to reach Qenf . Controllable events are blocked only when it is not
certain that Qenf will be reached.
3.3 Enforcement Monitors
Enforcement monitors are operational descriptions of enforcement mechanisms. Here,
we give a representation of the previous enforcement function as a transition system
whose output should be exactly the output of the enforcement function defined in sec-
tions 3.1 and 3.2. The purpose is to ease the implementation, since this representation
is closer to the real behavior of a monitor.
Definition 7 (Enforcement monitor). An enforcement monitor E for ϕ is a transition
system 〈CE , cE0 , Γ E , ↪→E〉 such that:
– CE = Q×Σ∗ is the set of configurations.
– cE0 = 〈q0, 〉 is the initial configuration.
– Γ E = Σ∗×{dump(.),pass-uncont(.), store-cont(.)}×Σ∗ is the alphabet, where
the first, second, and third members are an input, an operation, and an output,
respectively.
– ↪→E⊆ CE × Γ E × CE is the transition relation, defined as the smallest relation
obtained by applying the following rules in order (where w/ ./ /w′ stands for
(w, ./, w′) ∈ Γ E ):
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• dump: 〈q, σ.σc〉 / dump(σ)/σ−−−−−−−−−→ 〈q′, σc〉, with q σ−→ q′, and q′ ∈ Qenf ,
• pass-uncont: 〈q, σc〉 a/ pass-uncont(a)/a−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 〈q′, σc〉, with a ∈ Σu and q a−→ q′,
• store-cont: 〈q, σc〉 a/ store-cont(a)/−−−−−−−−−−−→ 〈q, σc.a〉.
Rule dump outputs a prefix of the word in memory (the buffer) whenever it is possible
to ensure soundness afterwards. Rule pass-uncont releases an uncontrollable event as
soon as it is received. Rule store-cont simply adds a controllable event at the end of
the buffer. Compared to section 3.2, the second member of the configuration represents
buffer σc in the definition of storeϕ, whereas σs is here represented by location q which
is the first member of the configuration, such that q = Reach(σs).
Proposition 3. The output of the enforcement monitor E for input σ is Eϕ(σ)
Remark 1. Enforcement monitors as per Definition 7 are somewhat similar to the ones
in [13], except that we choose to explicitly keep the memory as part of the configuration
and get uniform definitions in the untimed and timed settings (see Section 4). Hence,
enforcement monitors as per Definition 7 can also equivalently be defined using a finite-
state machine, extending the definition in [13].
4 Enforcement Monitoring of Timed Properties
In this section, we extend the framework presented in section 3 to enforce timed prop-
erties. Enforcement mechanisms and their properties should be redefined. Enforcement
functions need an extra parameter representing the date at which the output is observed.
Soundness has to be adapted because, at any time instant, one has to allow the property
not to hold, provided that it will hold in the future.
Considering uncontrollable events with timed properties raises several difficulties.
First, the order of the events might be modified. Thus, previous definitions of trans-
parency ([19]), stating that the output of an enforcement function will eventually be a
delayed prefix of the input, can not be used in this situation. Moreover, when delay-
ing some events to have the property satisfied in the future, one must consider the fact
that some uncontrollable events could occur at any moment (and cannot be delayed).
Finally, some properties enforceable in [18] cannot be enforced using uncontrollable
events, meaning that it is impossible to ensure the soundness of our enforcement mech-
anisms, as shown in Example 3. It could be possible to use the same definition of sound-
ness as in section 3, where the output always satisfies the property, but then soundness
would have been ensured for less properties (i.e. only for safety properties). Weaken-
ing soundness allows to enforce more properties, and to let enforcement mechanisms
produce longer outputs.
In this section, ϕ is a timed property defined by a deterministic and complete timed
automaton Aϕ = 〈L, l0, X, Σ,∆,G〉 with semantics JAϕK = 〈Q, q0, Γ,−→, FG〉.
4.1 Enforcement Functions and their Properties
An enforcement function takes a timed word and the current time as input, and outputs
a timed word:
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q1 q2
a, b,
x ≥ 2
a, b
Fig. 2: A timed property enforceable if Σu = ∅.
Definition 8 (Enforcement Function). An enforcement function is a function from
tw(Σ)× R≥0 to tw(Σ).
As for the untimed case, we define the notions of soundness and compliance.
Definition 9 (Soundness). An enforcement functionE is sound w.r.t. ϕ if ∀σ ∈ tw(Σ),
∀t ∈ R≥0,∃t′ ≥ t, E(σ, t′) |= ϕ.
Definition 10 (Compliance). An enforcement function E is compliant if ∀σ ∈ tw(Σ),
∀t ∈ R≥0,∃t′ ≥ t, E(σ, t′)|Σu = σ|Σu ∧ σ|Σc 4d E(σ, t′)|Σc .
An enforcement function is sound if for any input timed word, at any time instant, the
value of the enforcement function satisfies the property in the future. Compliance is
similar to the untimed setting but there are noteworthy differences. First, controllable
events can be delayed. Moreover, since timing information is attached to events, it is
not necessary to consider an event of Σu. Indeed, the dates of uncontrollable events
are the same in the input and in the output, meaning that they are emitted immedi-
ately upon their reception. Compliance states that controllable events can be delayed,
but their order must be preserved by the enforcement mechanism (i.e. when consider-
ing the projections on controllable events, the output should be a delayed prefix of the
input). Regarding uncontrollable events, any uncontrollable event is released immedi-
ately when received (i.e. when considering the projections on uncontrollable events, the
output should be equal to the input).
As in the untimed setting, we say that a property is enforceable whenever there
exists a sound and compliant enforcement function for this property.
4.2 Synthesizing an Enforcement Function
Example 3 (Non enforceable property). Consider the property defined by the automa-
ton in Fig. 2 with alphabet Σ = {a, b}. If all actions are controllable (Σu = ∅), the
property is enforceable because one needs to delay events until clock x exceeds 2. Oth-
erwise, the property is not enforceable. For instance, if Σu = {a}, word (1, a) cannot
be corrected.
We define a property Pre(ϕ), indicating whether it is possible to enforce property ϕ.
Definition 11 (Pre). Property Pre(ϕ) is defined as the timed property which semantics
is 〈Q, q0, Γ,−→′,Qenf〉 where:
– Qenf(ϕ) = {q ∈ FG | (q after tw(Σu)) ⊆ FG},
– Qenf(ϕ) = Q \Qenf(ϕ),
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– −→′= (−→ ∩Qenf ×Γ ×Q) ∪ {(q, γ, q) | q ∈ Qenf ∧γ ∈ Γ}.
Qenf(ϕ) is the set of states of JAϕK from which it is impossible to reach a bad state
reading only uncontrollable events. Thus, it corresponds to the set of states from which
it is possible to enforce the property under consideration. Qenf is the set of states of
the semantics of ϕ from which it is not possible to enforce the property, because there
is a timed word containing only uncontrollable events (which cannot be modified nor
suppressed) leading to a state that is not accepting. In the following, Qenf(ϕ) is noted
Qenf and Qenf(ϕ) is noted Qenf to ease the notation.
Pre(ϕ) is a property indicating whether it is possible to enforce ϕ from the state
of the semantics reached after reading a timed word (i.e. every possible continuation
leads to Qenf ). Note that once Qenf is reached, enforcement becomes effective, then the
property will always be satisfied in the future, which explains why Pre(ϕ) is a co-safety
property.
Note that, unlike in the untimed case, Qenf , Qenf and Pre(ϕ) are defined on the
semantics of the automaton representing the property and not on the automaton itself.
Indeed, the set of states in the semantics in the untimed setting is the same as the set of
locations of the property, thus the use of the semantics is not necessary.
We also define function Safe which, given a state, returns the set of sequences of
controllable events that can be emitted safely. Function Safe is then extended to words:
Definition 12 (Safe (states)).
– Given a state q of the semantics of a timed automaton,
Safe(q) = {σ ∈ Σ∗c | ∀w ∈ tw(Σ), ΠΣ(w|Σc) 4 σ =⇒ ∃w′ ∈ tw(Σ), w 4
w′ ∧ΠΣ(w′|Σc) 4 σ ∧ ∃q′ ∈ Qenf , q
w′−→ q′}.
– Given a word σ ∈ tw(Σ), Safe(σ) = Safe(q), with q = Reach(σ).
Intuitively, Safe(q) is the set of sequences of controllable events for which it is always
possible to compute dates to reach Qenf , even if any uncontrollable event occurs at any
time. Safe shall be used to determine if the enforcement mechanism can release some
previously-received controllable events. Contrary to the untimed case, some delay be-
tween two consecutive events may be needed to satisfy the property, thus an uncontrol-
lable event could be received by the enforcement mechanism while the delay elapses.
Should this happen, the enforcement mechanism needs to compute again the dates for
the events it has not output yet in order to reach Qenf if possible. Safe is used to ensure
this, i.e. that Qenf remains reachable with the events that have not been output yet even
if some uncontrollable events occur.
Let us now define an enforcement function for a timed property ϕ, denoted as Eϕ.
Definition 13 (Eϕ). Let storeϕ be the function defined inductively by storeϕ() =
(, , ), and for σ ∈ tw(Σ), and (t, a) such that σ.(t, a) ∈ tw(Σ), if (σs, σb, σc) =
storeϕ(σ), then
storeϕ(σ.(t, a)) =
{
(σ′s, σ
′
b, σ
′
c) if a ∈ Σu,
(σs. obs(σb, t), σ
′′
b , σ
′′
c ) if a ∈ Σc,
with:
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κϕ(σ1, σ2, t) = minlex(max4({w | ΠΣ(w) 4 σ2 ∧ date(w(1)) + time(σ1) ≥
t ∧ΠΣ(w) ∈ Safe(σ1) ∧ ∃qi ∈ Reach(σ1), qi w−→ qenf ∈ Qenf})).
σ′s = σs. obs(σb, t).(t, a),
σb1 = nobs(σb, t),
σ′b = κϕ(σ
′
s, ΠΣ(σb1).σc, t)+t time(σ
′
s),
σ′c = ΠΣ(σ
′
b)
−1.(ΠΣ(σb1).σc),
σ′′b = κϕ(σs. obs(σb, t), ΠΣ(σb1).σc.a, t)+t time(σs. obs(σb, t)),
σ′′c = ΠΣ(σ
′′
b )
−1.(ΠΣ(σb1).σc.a),
For σ ∈ tw(Σ), we define Eϕ(σ, t) = obs(Π1(sσ).Π2(sσ), t), with sσ = storeϕ(σ).
In the definition of storeϕ, the actions of the input belong to one of the three words σs,
σb and σc. Word σs represents what has already been output and cannot be modified
anymore. The timed word σb contains the controllable events that are about to be out-
put, such that if σb is concatenated to σs, the concatenation satisfies ϕ. The untimed
word σc contains the controllable actions that remain, meaning that, whatever dates are
associated to these actions, it is not sure that Qenf would be reached if it was emitted
after σb. Yet, the actions of σc might be released later (because of the occurrence of an
uncontrollable event for instance). Thus it is used to compute the new values for σb and
σc when needed. Note that only the events of σc are stored with no dates. Indeed, σc is
used only when recomputing dates, thus there is not any date to associate to the events
in σc. κϕ is computable: even though the number of words satisfying ΠΣ(w) 4 σ2 is
infinite, since there is an infinite number of possible dates, it is possible to consider only
a finite number of words, by considering only words that lead to different regions [1] of
the automaton. Moreover, checking if ΠΣ(w) ∈ Safe(σ1) is also computable, because
it is a reachability issue, that is computable in the region automaton.
Roughly speaking, the enforcement mechanism described in the previous definition
waits for the controllable events of the input to belong to the safe words of the current
state, reached with the uncontrollable events (i.e. in σc ∈ Safe(q) if q is the current
state), and then starts to emit as many controllable events as possible, with minimum
dates greater than the current time. Since the input is safe, Qenf will be reached at some
point in the future, and then the enforcement mechanism starts again to wait for the
input to be safe for the state reached so far, and goes on like previously.
Proposition 4. Eϕ is sound with respect to Pre(ϕ) =⇒ ϕ, as per Definition 9.
Proposition 5. Eϕ is compliant, as per Definition 10.
4.3 Enforcement Monitors
As in the untimed setting, we give here an operational description of an enforcement
mechanism whose output is exactly the output of Eϕ, as defined in Definition 13.
Definition 14. An enforcement monitor E for ϕ is a transition system 〈CE , cE0 , Γ E ,
↪→E〉 such that:
– CE = tw(Σ)×Σ∗c ×Q× R≥0 is the set of configurations.
– cE0 = 〈, , q0, 0〉 ∈ CE is the initial configuration.
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– Γ E = ((R≥0 ×Σ) ∪ {})×Op × ((R≥0 ×Σ) ∪ {}) is the alphabet, composed
of an optional input, an operation and an optional output. The set of operations is
{dump(.),pass-uncont(.), store-cont(.),delay(.)}. Whenever (σ, ./, σ′) ∈ Γ E , it
is noted σ/ ./ /σ′.
– ↪→E is the transition relation defined as the smallest relation obtained by applying
the following rules given by their priority order:
• Dump: 〈(tb, a).σb, σc, q, t〉 / dump(tb,a)/(tb,a)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 〈σb, σc, q′, t〉 if tb = t with
q
(tb,a)−−−→ q′,
• Pass-uncont: 〈σb, σc, q, t〉 (t,a)/ pass-uncont(t,a)/(t,a)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 〈σ′b, σ′c, q′, t〉, with q
(t,a)−−−→
q′ and (σ′b, σ
′
c) = update(q
′, σb, σc, t),
• Store-cont: 〈σb, σc, q, t〉 (t,c)/ store-cont((t,c))/−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 〈σ′b, σ′c, q, t〉, with (σ′b, σ′c) =
update(q, σb, σc.c, t),
• Delay: 〈σb, σc, (l, v), t〉 / delay(δ)/−−−−−−−−→ 〈σb, σc, (l, v + δ), t+ δ〉,
where update is a function computing κϕ from previous definition of Eϕ.
In a configuration 〈σb, σc, q, t〉, σb is the word to be output as time elapses; σc is what is
left from the input; q is the state of the semantics reached after reading what has already
been output; t is the current time instant, i.e. the time elapsed since the beginning of the
run.
Sequences σb and σc are as in the definition of storeϕ, whereas q represents σs,
such that q = Reach(σs). Function update computes the values of σb and σc to ensure
soundness. Function update represents the computation of function κϕ in the definition
of storeϕ.
Proposition 6. The output of E for input σ is Eϕ(σ).
4.4 Example
Figure 3 depicts a property modeling the use of some shared writable device. One can
get the status of a lock through the uncontrollable events LockOn and LockOff in-
dicating that the lock has been acquired, and that it is available, respectively. The un-
controllable event Auth is sent by the device to authorize writings. Once event Auth
is received, the controllable event Write can be sent after having waited a little bit for
synchronization. Each time the lock is acquired and released, we must also wait before
issuing a new Write order. The sets of events are: Σc = {Write} and Σu = {Auth,
LockOff, LockOn}.
Let us follow the output of function storeϕ over time with the following input word:
σ = (1,Auth). (2,LockOn). (4,Write). (5,LockOff). (6,LockOn). (7,Write).
(8,LockOff). Let (σs, σb, σc) = storeϕ(obs(σ, t)). Table 1 gives the values taken by
σs, σb, and σc over time. To compute them, first notice that Qenf = {l1, l2} × V({x}).
Moreover, we can see that Write ∈ Safe(l1) because it is always possible to delay
the Write event in such a way that the current state remains in Qenf , whatever are
the uncontrollable events. Consequently, whenever σs leads to l1, σb is empty (because
Write is the only controllable event, thus σb must start with a Write event).
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l0 l1
l3
l2
Auth
Auth,
LockOff x := 0,
Write x ≥ 2
LockOn
Auth
LockOn
LockOff
x := 0
Write
LockOn
LockOff
Write
x < 2
Write
Σ
Fig. 3: Property modeling writes on a shared storage device
Figure 4 shows the execution of the enforcement monitor with input (1,Auth).
(2,LockOn). (4,Write). (5,LockOff). (6,LockOn). (7,Write).(8,LockOff).
In a configuration, the input is on the right, the output on the left, and the middle is the
current configuration of the enforcement monitor. Variable t keeps track of global time.
A valuation is represented as an integer – the value of the (unique) clock x. Observe
that the final output at t = 10 is the same as the one of the enforcement function:
(1,Auth).(2,LockOn).(5,LockOff).(6,LockOn).(8,LockOff).(10,Write).
(10,Write)
5 Related Work
Runtime enforcement was pioneered by Schneider with security automata [21], a run-
time mechanism for enforcing safety properties. In this work monitors are able to stop
the execution of the system once a deviation of the property has been detected. Later,
Ligatti et al. proposed edit-automata, a more powerful model of enforcement monitors
able to introduce and suppress events from the execution. Later, more general mod-
els were proposed where the monitors can be synthesized from regular properties [13].
More recently, Bloem et al. [6] presented a framework to synthesize enforcement mon-
itors for reactive systems, called as shields, from a set of safety properties. A shield acts
instantaneously and cannot buffer actions. Whenever a property violation is unavoid-
able, the shield allows to deviate from the property for k consecutive steps (as in [7]).
Whenever a second violation occurs within k steps, then the shield enters into a fail-
safe mode, where it ensures only correctness. Another recent approach by Dolzehnko et
al [11] introduces Mandatory Result Automata (MRAs). MRAs extend edit-automata
by refining the input-output relationship of an enforcement mechanism and thus allow-
ing a more precise description of the enforcement abilities of an enforcement mecha-
nism in concrete application scenarios. All the previously mentioned approaches con-
sidered untimed specifications, and do not consider uncontrollable events.
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t = 0 /(, , (l0, 0), 0)/(1,Auth).(2,on).(4,w).(5,off).(6,on).(7,w).(8,off)
↓ delay(1)
t = 1 /(, , (l0, 1), 1)/(1,Auth).(2,on).(4,w).(5,off).(6,on).(7,w).(8,off)
↓ pass-uncont((1,Auth))
t = 1 (1,Auth)/(, , (l1, 1), 1)/(2,on).(4,w).(5,off).(6,on).(7,w).(8,off)
↓ delay(1)
t = 2 (1,Auth)/(, , (l1, 2), 2)/(2,on).(4,w).(5,off).(6,on).(7,w).(8,off)
↓ pass-uncont((2,on))
t = 2 (1,Auth).(2,on)/(, , (l2, 2), 2)/(4,w).(5,off).(6,on).(7,w).(8,off)
↓ delay(2)
t = 4 (1,Auth).(2,on)/(, , (l2, 4), 4)/(4,w).(5,off).(6,on).(7,w).(8,off)
↓ store-cont((4,w))
t = 4 (1,Auth).(2,on)/(, (4,w), (l2, 4), 4)/(5,off).(6,on).(7,w).(8,off)
↓ delay(1)
t = 5 (1,Auth).(2,on)/(, (4,w), (l2, 5), 5)/(5,off).(6,on).(7,w).(8,off)
↓ pass-uncont((5,off))
t = 5 (1,Auth).(2,on).(5,off)/((7,w), , (l1, 0), 5)/(6,on).(7,w).(8,off)
↓ delay(1)
t = 6 (1,Auth).(2,on).(5,off)/((7,w), , (l1, 1), 6)/(6,on).(7,w).(8,off)
↓ pass-uncont((6,on))
t = 6 (1,Auth).(2,on).(5,off).(6,on)/(, (7,w), (l2, 1), 6)/(7,w).(8,off)
↓ delay(1)
t = 7 (1,Auth).(2,on).(5,off).(6,on)/(, (7,w), (l2, 2), 7)/(7,w).(8,off)
↓ store-cont((7,w))
t = 7 (1,Auth).(2,on).(5,off).(6,on)/(, (7,w).(7,w), (l2, 2), 7)/(8,off)
↓ delay(1)
t = 8 (1,Auth).(2,on).(5,off).(6,on)/(, (7,w).(7,w), (l2, 3), 8)/(8,off)
↓ pass-uncont((8,off))
t = 8 (1,Auth).(2,on).(5,off).(6,on).(8,off)/((10,w).(10,w), , (l1, 0), 8)/
↓ delay(2)
t = 10 (1,Auth).(2,on).(5,off).(6,on).(8,off)/((10,w).(10,w), , (l1, 2), 10)/
↓ dump((10,w))
t = 10 (1,Auth).(2,on).(5,off).(6,on).(8,off).(10,w)/((10,w), , (l1, 2), 10)/
↓ dump((10,w))
t = 10 (1,Auth).(2,on).(5,off).(6,on).(8,off).(10,w).(10,w)/(, , (l1, 2), 10)/
Fig. 4: Execution of an enforcement monitor with input (1,Auth). (2,LockOn).
(4,Write). (5,LockOff). (6,LockOn). (7,Write). (8,LockOff). LockOff is
abbreviated as off, LockOn as on, and Write as w
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Table 1: Values of (σs, σb, σc) = storeϕ((1,Auth). (2,LockOn). (4,Write).
(5,LockOff). (6,LockOn). (7,Write). (8,LockOff)) over time.
t σs σb σc
1 (1,Auth)  
2 (1,Auth).(2,LockOn)  
4 (1,Auth).(2,LockOn)  Write
5 (1,Auth).(2,LockOn).(5,LockOff) (7,Write) 
6 (1,Auth).(2,LockOn).(5,LockOff).
(6,LockOn)
 Write
7 (1,Auth).(2,LockOn).(5,LockOff).
(6,LockOn)
 Write . Write
8 (1,Auth).(2,LockOn).(5,LockOff).
(6,LockOn).(8,LockOff)
(10,Write).(10,Write) 
10 (1,Auth).(2,LockOn).(5,LockOff).
(6,LockOn).(8,LockOff).(10,Write).
(10,Write)
 
In the timed setting, several monitoring tools for timed specifications have been
proposed. RT-Mac [20] permits to verify at runtime timeliness and reliability correct-
ness. LARVA [8,9] takes as input safety properties expressed with DATEs (Dynamic
Automata with Times and Events), a timed model similar to timed automata.
In previous work, we introduced runtime enforcement for timed properties [19]
specified by timed automata [1]. We proposed a model of enforcement monitors that
work as delayers, that is, mechanisms that are able to delay the input sequence of
timed events to correct it. While [19] proposed synthesis techniques only for safety
and co-safety properties, we then generalized the framework to synthesize an enforce-
ment monitor for any regular timed property [17,18]. In [16], we considered parametric
timed properties, that is timed properties with data-events containing information from
the execution of the monitored system. None of our previous research endeavors consid-
ered uncontrollable events. Considering uncontrollable events entailed us to revisit and
redefine all the notions related to enforcement mechanisms (soundness, transparency
weaken into compliance, enforcement function, and enforcement monitor). Moreover,
we define an enforcement condition as a property, that allows to determine when an
enforcement mechanism can safely output controllable events, independently of the un-
controllable events that can be received by the enforcement mechanism.
Basin et al. [4] introduced uncontrollable events in safety properties enforced with
security automata [21]. More recently, Basin et al. proposed a more general approach [3]
related to enforcement of security policies with controllable and uncontrollable events.
Basin et al. presented several complexity results and showed how to synthesize enforce-
ment mechanisms. In case of violation of the property, the system stops the execution.
The approaches in [4,3] only handle discrete time, and clock ticks are considered as un-
controllable events. In our framework, we consider dense time using the expressiveness
of timed automata. We synthesize enforcement mechanisms for any regular property,
and not just safety properties. Moreover, our monitor are more flexible since they block
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the input word only when delaying events cannot prevent the violation of the desired
property, thus offering the possibility to correct violations due to the timing of events.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
This paper extends the research endeavors on runtime enforcement and focuses on
the use of uncontrollable events. An enforcement mechanism can only observe un-
controllable events, but cannot delay nor suppress them. Considering uncontrollable
events entails to change the order between controllable and uncontrollable events, and
to adapt the usual requirements on enforcement mechanisms. Therefore, we weaken
transparency into compliance. We define enforcement mechanisms at two levels of ab-
straction (enforcement functions and enforcement monitors), for regular properties and
regular timed properties. Since not all properties can be enforced, we also give a con-
dition, depending on the property and the input word, indicating whether or not the
enforcement mechanism can be sound with respect to the property under scrutiny. An
enforcement mechanism outputs all received uncontrollable events, and stores the con-
trollable ones, until soundness can be guaranteed. Then, it outputs events only when it
can ensure that soundness will be satisfied.
Several extensions of this work are possible. A first extension is to consider more
risky strategies regarding uncontrollable events, outputting events even if some uncon-
trollable events could lead to a bad state. Following such strategies could be guided
by an additional probabilistic model on the occurrence of input events. A second ex-
tension is to implement the enforcement mechanisms using UPPAAL libraries [14]. A
third extension is to use runtime enforcement to modify at runtime the parameters of a
system with stochastic behavior, as done offline in [2]. A fourth extension is to define a
theory of runtime enforcement for distributed systems where enforcement monitors are
decentralised on the components of the verified system, as is the case with verification
monitors in [5]. A fifth extension is to distinguish inputs from outputs in properties, and
consider for instance timed i/o automata [10] to formalise properties.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proofs for the Untimed Setting
In all this section, we will use the notations from section 3, meaning that ϕ is a prop-
erty whose associated automaton is Aϕ = 〈Q, q0, Σ,−→, F 〉, Qenf = {q ∈ F |
(q afterΣ∗u) ⊆ F}, and Qenf = Q \ Qenf . In some proofs, we also use notations
from Definition 6.
Lemma 1. If Aϕ is deterministic and complete, then Pre(ϕ) is deterministic and com-
plete.
Proof. The modifications made to−→ only modify the destination state, never the source
state nor the action. Thus, if A is deterministic and complete, Pre(ϕ) is too.
Lemma 2. Enf(ϕ) =⇒ ϕ.
Proof. Qenf ⊆ F , thus, for all σ ∈ Σ∗, if σ satisfies Enf(ϕ), then σ also satisfies ϕ.
Lemma 3. ∀σ ∈ Σ∗,∀a ∈ Σ, (σ 6|= Pre(ϕ) ∧ σ.a |= Pre(ϕ)) =⇒ σ.a |= Enf(ϕ).
Proof. Let us consider σ ∈ Σ∗ such that σ 6|= Pre(ϕ), and a ∈ Σ such that σ.a |=
Pre(ϕ). Let us note −→1=−→ ∩Qenf ×Σ × Q, −→2= {(q, a, q) | q ∈ Qenf ∧a ∈ Σ},
and −→c=−→1 ∪ −→2, so that Pre(ϕ) = 〈Q, q0, Σ,−→c,Qenf〉.
Pre(ϕ) is a co-safety property. Thus @σ′ 4 σ, q0 σ
′
−→c q, with q ∈ Qenf . Thus,
if q is such that q0
σ−→c q, then q0 σ−→1 q. Since σ 6|= Pre(ϕ), q ∈ Qenf . Moreover,
σ.a |= Pre(ϕ), thus ∃q′ ∈ Qenf , q a−→c q′. Since q ∈ Qenf , q
a−→1 q′. Furthermore,
−→1⊆−→, thus q0 σ.a−−→ q′, meaning that σ.a |= Enf(ϕ) because q′ ∈ Qenf .
Proposition 1. Eϕ is sound with respect to Pre(ϕ) =⇒ ϕ, as per Definition 3.
Proof. Let P(σ) be the predicate: “Eϕ(σ) |= Pre(ϕ) =⇒ Enf(ϕ)”. Let us prove that
∀σ ∈ Σ∗,P(σ).
– Induction basis: Eϕ() = . If  |= Pre(ϕ), then q0 ∈ Qenf , thus  |= Enf(ϕ). This
means that P() holds.
– Induction step: Suppose now that, for some σ ∈ Σ∗, P(σ) holds. Let us consider
a ∈ Σ. Let us prove that P(σ.a) holds.
• If Eϕ(σ.a) 6|= Pre(ϕ), then P(σ.a) holds.
• If Eϕ(σ) 6|= Pre(ϕ) ∧ Eϕ(σ.a) |= Pre(ϕ):
∗ If a ∈ Σu, then considering σ′s from Definition 6, either σ′s 6=  and
then Eϕ(σ.a) |= Enf(ϕ), or σ′s = , meaning that Eϕ(σ.a) = Eϕ(σ).a.
Eϕ(σ) 6|= Pre(ϕ), andEϕ(σ).a |= Pre(ϕ). Thus, using lemma 3,Eϕ(σ).a =
Eϕ(σ.a) |= Enf(ϕ). In both cases, P(σ.a).
∗ If a ∈ Σc, then, since Eϕ(σ) |= Pre(ϕ) and Eϕ(σ.a) 6|= Pre(ϕ), Eϕ(σ) 6=
Eϕ(σ.a). Thus, σ′′s 6= , which means that Eϕ(σ.a) |= Enf(ϕ). Thus
P(σ.a).
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• If Eϕ(σ) |= Pre(ϕ), then Eϕ(σ) |= Enf(ϕ) because P(σ) holds.
∗ If a ∈ Σu, then, considering σ′s as in Definition 6, if σ′s 6=  thenEϕ(σ.a) |=
Enf(ϕ), meaning thatP(σ.a) holds. Otherwise, σ′s = , and thenEϕ(σ.a) =
Eϕ(σ).a. Since Eϕ(σ) |= Enf(ϕ), ∃q ∈ Qenf , q0 Eϕ(σ)−−−−→ q. Then ∃q′ ∈
Qenf , q
a−→ q′, because a ∈ Σu. Thus q0 Eϕ(σ).a−−−−−→ q′, meaning thatEϕ(σ).a =
Eϕ(σ.a) |= Enf(ϕ) because q′ ∈ Qenf . Thus P(σ.a).
∗ If a ∈ Σc, then considering σ′′s as defined in Definition 6, if σ′′s 6= 
then Eϕ(σ.a) |= Enf(ϕ). Otherwise, σ′′s = , meaning that Eϕ(σ.a) =
Eϕ(σ) |= Enf(ϕ). In both cases, P(σ.a) holds.
In all cases, P(σ.a) holds. Thus, P(σ) =⇒ P(σ.a).
By induction, ∀σ ∈ Σ∗,Eϕ(σ) |= Pre(ϕ) =⇒ Enf(ϕ). Thus, using lemma 2,
∀σ ∈ Σ∗,Eϕ(σ) |= Pre(ϕ) =⇒ ϕ.
Proposition 2. Eϕ is compliant, as per Definition 4.
Proof. Let P(σ) be the predicate: “(σs, σc) = storeϕ(σ) =⇒ σs|Σc .σc = σ|Σc”. Let
us prove that ∀σ ∈ Σ∗,P(σ) holds.
– Induction basis: storeϕ() = (, ), and |Σc = |Σc .. Thus P() holds.
– Induction step: suppose now that for σ ∈ Σ∗,P(σ) holds. Let us consider (σs, σc) =
storeϕ(σ), a ∈ Σ, and (σt, σd) = storeϕ(σ.a). Let us prove that P(σ.a) holds.
• If a ∈ Σu, then σt = σs.a.σ′s and σt.σd = σs.a.σc. Therefore, σt|Σc .σd =
σs|Σc .σ
′
s.σ
′−1
s .σc = σs|Σc .σc. Since P(σ), σt|Σc .σd = σ|Σc = (σ.a)|Σc . Thus
P(σ.a).
• If a ∈ Σc, then σt = σs.σ′′s and σt.σd = σs.σc.a. Therefore, σt|Σc .σd =
σs|Σc .σ
′′
s .σ
′′−1
s .σc.a = σs|Σc .σc.a = σ|Σc .a = (σ.a)|Σc . Thus P(σ.a).
Thus, ∀σ ∈ Σ∗,∀a ∈ Σ,P(σ) =⇒ P(σ.a).
By induction on σ, ∀σ ∈ Σ∗, (σs, σc) = storeϕ(σ) =⇒ σs|Σc .σc = σ|Σc .
Moreover, ∀σ ∈ Σ∗,∀u ∈ Σu, if (σs, σc) = storeϕ(σ) and (σt, σd) = storeϕ(σ.u),
then σt = σs.u.σ′s, thus σs.u 4 σt, meaning that Eϕ(σ).u 4 Eϕ(σ.u).
Thus, ∀σ ∈ Σ∗,Eϕ(σ)|Σc 4 σ|Σc ∧ ∀u ∈ Σu,Eϕ(σ).u 4 Eϕ(σ.u), meaning that
Eϕ is compliant.
Proposition 3. The output of the enforcement monitor E for input σ is Eϕ(σ)
Proof. Let us introduce some notation for this proof: for a word w ∈ Γ E∗, we note
input(w) = Π1(w(1)).Π1(w(2)) . . . Π1(w(|w|)), the word obtained by concatenating
the first members (the inputs) of w. In a similar way, we note output(w) = Π3(w(1)).
Π3(w(2)) . . . Π3(w(|w|)), the word obtained by concatenating all the third members
(outputs) of w. We also define the Rules function as follows:
Rules :
{
Σ∗ → Γ E∗
σ 7→ max4({w ∈ Γ E∗ | input(w) = σ ∧ ∃c1 ∈ CE , cE0 w−→ c1})
For a word σ ∈ Σ∗, Rules(σ) is the trace of the longest valid run in E , i.e. the
sequence of all the rules that can be applied with input σ. We then extend the definition
of output to words in Σ∗: for σ ∈ Σ∗, output(σ) = output(Rules(σ)).
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Let P(σ) be the predicate: “Eϕ(σ) = output(σ) ∧ ((σs, σc) = storeϕ(σ) ∧
cE0
Rules(σ)−−−−−→ 〈q, σ′c〉) =⇒ (q = Reach(σs) ∧ σc = σ′c)”.
Let us prove that for all σ ∈ Σ∗, P(σ) holds.
– Induction basis: Eϕ() =  = output(). Moreover, storeϕ() = (, ), and cE0
−→
cE0 . Therefore, as c
E
0 = 〈q0, 〉, P() holds, because Reach() = q0.
– Induction step: Let us suppose now that for some σ ∈ Σ∗, P(σ) holds. Let us con-
sider (σs, σc) = storeϕ(σ), q = Reach(σs), a ∈ Σ, and (σt, σd) = storeϕ(σ.a).
Let us prove that P(σ.a) holds.
Since P(σ) holds, cE0
Rules(w)−−−−−−→ 〈q, σc〉 and σs = output(σ).
• If a ∈ Σu, then considering σ′s as defined in Definition 6, σt = σs.a.σ′s.
Moreover, a ∈ Σu, thus rule pass-uncont can be applied: there exists q′ ∈ Q
such that q a−→ q′, and then 〈q, σc〉 a/ pass-uncont(a)/a−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 〈q′, σc〉. If σ′s 6= , then
σt = σs.a.σ
′
s |= Enf(ϕ), meaning that there exists q′′ ∈ Qenf such that q′
σ′s−→
q′′, and then rule dump can be applied: 〈q′, σc〉 / dump(σ
′
s)/σ
′
s−−−−−−−−−−→ 〈q′′, σ′−1s .σc〉.
Thus, output(σ.a) = output(σ).a.σ′s = σs.a.σ
′
s = σt, q
′′ = Reach(σt),
and σd = σ′−1s .σc, meaning that P(σ.a) holds. Otherwise, σ
′
s = , and then
it is impossible to apply dump rule, because it is impossible to reach Qenf
with a prefix of σc. Thus, output(σ.a) = output(σ).a = σs.a = σt, q′ =
Reach(σt), and σd = σc. Thus, P(σ.a) holds.
Thus, if a ∈ Σu, P(σ.a) holds.
• Otherwise, a ∈ Σc, and then, considering σ′′s as defined in Definition 6, σt =
σs.σ
′′
s . Since a ∈ Σc, it is possible to apply the store-cont rule:
〈q, σc〉 a/ store-cont(a)/−−−−−−−−−−−→ 〈q, σc.a〉. Then, if σ′′s = σc.a, it is possible to apply
the dump rule. Therefore, there exists q′ ∈ Qenf such that q σc.a−−−→ q′, and then
〈q, σc.a〉 / dump(σc.a)/σc.a−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 〈q′, 〉. Thus, output(σ.a) = output(σ).σc.a =
σs.σc.a = σt, q′ = Reach(σt), and σd = σ′′−1s .(σc.a) = , meaning that
P(σ.a) holds.
Otherwise, σ′′s = , and no rule can be applied anymore, thus output(σ.a) =
output(σ) = σs = σt, q = Reach(σt), and σd = σ′′−1s .(σc.a) = σc.a. Thus,
P(σ.a) holds.
Thus, if a ∈ Σu, P(σ.a) holds.
Thus, P(σ) =⇒ P(σ.a).
Thus, by induction on σ, ∀σ ∈ Σ∗,P(σ) holds, meaning that ∀σ ∈ Σ∗,Eϕ(σ) =
output(σ).
A.2 Proofs for the Timed Setting
In this section, we use the notations from section 4, meaning that ϕ is a timed prop-
erty, represented by a deterministic and complete timed automaton Aϕ = 〈L, l0, X,
Σ,∆,G〉 with semantics JAϕK = 〈Q, q0, Γ,−→, FG〉.
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Lemma 4. ∀σ ∈ tw(Σ),∀(t, a) such that σ.(t, a) ∈ tw(Σ), (σ 6|= Pre(ϕ)∧σ.(t, a) |=
Pre(ϕ)) =⇒ σ.(t, a) |= ϕ′, with ϕ′ = 〈Q, q0, Γ,−→,Qenf〉.
Proof. Let us consider σ ∈ tw(Σ), and (t, a) such that σ 6|= Pre(ϕ) ∧ σ.(t, a) |=
Pre(ϕ). Let us note −→1=−→ ∩(Qenf ×Γ × Q), −→2= {(q, a, q) | q ∈ Qenf ∧a ∈ Γ},
and −→3=−→1 ∪ −→2, so that Pre(ϕ) = 〈Q, q0, Γ,−→3,Qenf〉.
Then, σ 6|= Pre(ϕ), thus ∀σ′ 4 σ, σ′ 6|= Pre(ϕ), since Pre(ϕ) is a co-safety prop-
erty. So, @q ∈ Qenf , q0 σ
′
−→ q, thus q0 σ−→1 q. Moreover, since σ 6|= Pre(ϕ), q 6∈ Qenf ,
so ∃q′ ∈ Q, q (t,a)−−−→1 q′. Since σ.(t, a) |= Pre(ϕ), q′ ∈ Qenf . Thus, because −→1⊆−→,
q0
σ.(t,a)−−−−→ q′, meaning that σ.(t, a) |= ϕ′.
Lemma 5. ∀σ ∈ tw(Σ), σ |= ϕ′ =⇒  ∈ Safe(σ), with ϕ′ = 〈Q, q0, Γ,−→,Qenf〉.
Proof. Let us consider σ ∈ tw(σ) such that σ |= ϕ′. Then q = Reach(σ) ∈ Qenf ,
thus if w is such that ΠΣ(w|Σc) 4 , then w ∈ tw(Σu), and w satisfies ΠΣ(w|Σc) 4
ΠΣ(w|Σc) 4  ∧ ∀i ∈ [1; |w|Σc |],date(w|Σc(i)) ≤ date(w|Σc(i)) ∧ w|Σu = wΣu .
Moreover, since q ∈ Qenf , and w ∈ tw(Σu), ∃q′ ∈ Qenf , q w−→ q′. Thus  ∈ Safe(q) =
Safe(σ).
Lemma 6. ∀σ ∈ tw(Σ), (σs, σb, σc) = storeϕ(σ) =⇒ ((σs.σb 6|= Pre(ϕ)) =⇒
σb = ).
Proof. Let us consider the predicate P(σ) : “(σs, σb, σc) = storeϕ(σ) =⇒ ((σs.σb 6|=
Pre(ϕ)) =⇒ σb = )”. Let us prove that ∀σ ∈ tw(Σ),P(σ).
– storeϕ() = (, , ), thus P().
– Suppose now that for some σ ∈ tw(Σ), P(σ), and let us consider (t, a) such that
σ.(t, a) ∈ tw(Σ), (σs, σb, σc) = storeϕ(σ), and (σt, σd, σe) = storeϕ(σ.(t, a)).
• If σt.σd |= Pre(ϕ), then P(σ.(t, a)).
• If σt.σd 6|= Pre(ϕ), then if σd 6= , and q = Reach(σt) then there exists
q′ ∈ Qenf such that q σd−→ q′, meaning that σt.σd |= Pre(ϕ), which is absurd.
Thus σd = , meaning that P(σ.(t, a)) holds.
Thus, P(σ) =⇒ P(σ.(t, a)).
By induction, ∀σ ∈ tw(Σ), (σs, σb, σc) = storeϕ(σ) =⇒ (σs.σb 6|= Pre(ϕ) =⇒
σb = ).
Proposition 4. Eϕ is sound with respect to Pre(ϕ) =⇒ ϕ, as per Definition 9.
Proof. Let ϕ′ = 〈Q, q0, Γ,−→,Qenf〉. We then show that Eϕ is correct with respect
to Pre(ϕ) =⇒ ϕ′. Let P(σ) be the predicate: “((σs, σb, σc) = storeϕ(σ)) =⇒
((σs.σb |= Pre(ϕ)) =⇒ (ΠΣ(σb) ∈ Safe(σs) ∧ σs.σb |= ϕ′))”. Let us prove that
∀σ ∈ tw(Σ),P(σ) holds.
– Induction basis: storeϕ() = (, , ). If  |= Pre(ϕ), then q0 ∈ Qenf , thus  |= ϕ′,
and, using lemma 5,  ∈ Safe(). Thus P() holds.
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– Induction step: Suppose now that, for some σ ∈ tw(Σ),P(σ) holds. Let us consider
(t, a) ∈ R≥0 × Σ such that σ.(t, a) ∈ tw(Σ), (σs, σb, σc) = storeϕ(σ) and
(σt, σd, σe) = storeϕ(σ.(t, a)).
• If σt.σd 6|= Pre(ϕ), then P(σ.(t, a)) holds.
• If σs.σb 6|= Pre(ϕ) and σt.σd |= Pre(ϕ):
∗ If a ∈ Σu, then if σd 6=  thenP(σ.(t, a)) holds, following the construction
of σd. Otherwise, σd = , and then, since σs.σb 6|= Pre(ϕ), using lemma 6,
σb = . Thus σs.σb = σs 6|= Pre(ϕ), and σt = σs. obs(σb, t).(t, a) =
σs.(t, a). So, σt.σd = σt = σs.(t, a). Since σs 6|= Pre(ϕ), and σt.σd =
σs.(t, a) |= Pre(ϕ), then, using lemma 4, σt.σd |= ϕ′, and then, using
lemma 5 σd =  ∈ Safe(σt). Thus P(σ.(t, a)) holds.
∗ If a ∈ Σc, then either σd 6= , and then P(σ.(t, a)) holds (following the
construction of σd), or σd = , in which case σt.σd = σt = σs. obs(σb, t).
Since σs.σb 6|= Pre(ϕ), then, using lemma 4, σb = , thus σt = σs. Thus,
σt.σd = σt |= Pre(ϕ), and σt = σs 6|= Pre(ϕ), which is absurb, thus
σd 6=  in this case.
• If σs.σb |= Pre(ϕ) and σt.σd |= Pre(ϕ):
∗ If a ∈ Σu, then either σd 6= , and then P(σ.(t, a)) holds (by construc-
tion of σd), or σd = , leading to σt.σd = σt = σs. obs(σb, t).(t, a).
Since P(σ) holds and σs.σb |= Pre(ϕ), σb ∈ Safe(σs), meaning that if
qi = Reach(σs),∃w ∈ tw(Σ), obs(σb, t).(t, a) 4 w ∧ΠΣ(w|Σc) 4 σb ∧
w|Σu = obs(σb, t)|Σu .(t, a) ∧ ∃q ∈ Qenf , qi w−→ q, (because
ΠΣ((obs(σb, t).(t, a))|Σc) 4 ΠΣ(σb)). Since σd = ,w = obs(σb, t).(t, a).
Thus q0
σs−→ qi obs(σb,t).(t,a)−−−−−−−−−→ q,meaning that q = Reach(σt) ∈ Qenf .
Thus σt.σd = σt |= ϕ′, thus, using lemma 5, σd =  ∈ Safe(σt). Thus
P(σ.(t, a)) holds.
∗ If a ∈ Σc, then either σd 6=  and P(σ.(t, a)) holds (following the con-
struction of σd), or σd =  and then σt.σd = σt = σs. obs(σb, t). Since
P(σ) holds and σs.σb |= Pre(ϕ), ΠΣ(σb) ∈ Safe(σs). Thus, if qi =
Reach(σs), then there exists w ∈ tw(Σ) such that obs(σb, t) 4 w ∧
ΠΣ(w|Σc) 4 ΠΣ(σb) ∧ w|Σu =  ∧ ∃q ∈ Qenf , qi w−→ q. Since σd = ,
w = obs(σb, t), so σt |= ϕ′, thus, using lemma 5 σd =  ∈ Safe(σt). Thus
P(σ.(t, a)) holds.
In all cases, P(σ.(t, a) holds.
Thus, P(σ) =⇒ P(σ.(t, a)).
By induction, ∀σ ∈ tw(Σ),P(σ) holds, thus ∀σ ∈ tw(Σ), ((σs, σb, σc) =
storeϕ(σ)) =⇒ (σs.σb |= Pre(ϕ) =⇒ ϕ′). Therefore, ∀t ∈ R≥0,∃t′ ≥
t,Eϕ(σ, t) |= Pre(ϕ) =⇒ ϕ′. Since ϕ′ =⇒ ϕ, ∀t ∈ R≥0,∃t′ ≥ t,Eϕ(σ, t) |=
Pre(ϕ) =⇒ ϕ. This means that Eϕ is sound with respect to Pre(ϕ) =⇒ ϕ.
Proposition 5. Eϕ is compliant, as per Definition 10.
Proof. LetP(σ) be the predicate: “(σs, σb, σc) = storeϕ(σ) =⇒ (ΠΣ(σs|Σc .σb).σc =
ΠΣ(σ|Σc)∧(σs.σb)|Σu = σ|Σu)∧∀i ∈ [1; |σs|Σc .σb|],date((σs|Σc .σb)(i)) ≥ date(σ|Σc(i))”.
Let us prove that ∀σ ∈ tw(Σ),P(σ) holds.
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– Induction basis: storeϕ() = (, , ), and |Σc = |Σu = . Thus, P() holds.
– Induction step: Suppose now that for some σ ∈ tw(Σ),P(σ) holds. Let us consider
(σs, σb, σc) = storeϕ(σ), (t, a) such that σ.(t, a) ∈ tw(Σ), and (σt, σd, σe) =
storeϕ(σ.(t, a)).
• If a ∈ Σu:
∗ (σt.σd)|Σu = σt|Σu (σd ∈ tw(Σc)), thus (σt.σd)|Σu = σs|Σu .(t, a), be-
cause σb ∈ tw(Σc), and σc ∈ Σ∗c . Thus (σt.σd)|Σu = σ|Σu .(t, a) =
(σ.(t, a))|Σu , since P(σ) holds and a ∈ Σu.
∗ ΠΣ(σt|Σc .σd).σe = ΠΣ(σs|Σc .σb).σc = ΠΣ(σ|Σc), since P(σ) holds.
∗ σt = σs. obs(σb, t).(t, a), thus σt|Σc = σs. obs(σb, t). Since P(σ) holds,
∀i ∈ [1; |σt|Σc |],date(σt|Σc(i)) ≥ date(σ|Σc(i)). Moreover, by construc-
tion of σd, date(σd(1)) ≥ t, meaning that ∀i ∈ [1; |σd|],date(σd(i)) ≥ t.
Thus, ∀i ∈ [1; |σt|Σc .σd|],date((σt|Σc .σd)(i)) ≥ date((σ.(t, a))|Σc(i)).
Thus P(σ.(t, a)) holds.
• If a ∈ Σc:
∗ (σt.σd)|Σu = σs|Σu = σ|Σu , because σb ∈ tw(Σc), σd ∈ tw(Σc) and
P(σ) holds.
∗ ΠΣ(σt|Σc .σd).σe = ΠΣ(σs|Σc .σb).σc.a = ΠΣ(σ|Σc).a =
ΠΣ((σ.(t, a))|Σc).
∗ σt = σs. obs(σb, t). Since P(σ) holds, ∀i ∈ [1; |σt|],date(σt|Σc(i)) ≥
date((σ.(t, a))|Σc(i)). Moreover, by construction of σd, ∀i ∈ [1; |σd|],date(σd(i)) ≥
t. Thus, ∀i ∈ [1; |σt|Σc .σd|],date((σt|Σc .σd)(i)) ≥ date((σ.(t, a))|Σc(i)).
Thus P(σ.(t, a)) holds.
Thus P(σ) =⇒ P(σ.(t, a)).
By induction, ∀σ ∈ tw(Σ), (σs, σb, σc) = storeϕ(σ) =⇒ ΠΣ(σs|Σc .σb).σc =
ΠΣ(σ|Σc)∧(σs.σb)|Σu = σ|Σu∧∀i ∈ [1; |σs|Σc .σb|],date((σs|Σc .σb)(i)) ≥ date(σ|Σc(i)).
Thus, (σs.σb)|Σc 4d σ|Σc ∧ (σs.σb)|σu = σ|Σu .
Thus Eϕ is compliant.
Proposition 6. The output of E for input σ is Eϕ(σ).
Proof. For this proof, let us introduce some notation. For a word w ∈ Γ E∗, we note
input(w) = Π1(w(1)).Π1(w(2)) . . . Π1(w(|w|)) the concatenation of all inputs from
w. In the same way, we define output(w) = Π3(w(1)).Π3(w(2)) . . . Π3(w(|w|)) the
concatenation of all outputs from w. Let us also define function Rules which, given a
timed word and a date, give the longest sequence of rules that can be applied with the
given word as input at the date given:
Rules :

tw(Σ)× R≥0 → Γ E
(σ, t) 7→ max4({ w ∈ Γ
E | input(w) = σ ∧ ∃c ∈ CE ,
cE0
w−→ c ∧Π4(c) = t})
Since time is not discrete, the rule delay can be applied an infinite number of times
by slicing time. Thus, we consider that the rule delay is always applied a minimum
number of times, i.e., when two rules delay are consecutive, they are merged into one
rule delay, whose parameter is the sum of the parameters of the two rules. The runs
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obtained are equivalent, but it allows to consider the maximum (for prefix order) of the
set used in the definition of Rules.
We then extend output to timed words with a date: for σ ∈ tw(Σ), and a date t,
output(σ, t) = output(Rules(σ, t)).
Let P(σ) be the predicate: “∀t ∈ R≥0,Eϕ(σ, t) = output(σ, t) ∧ (((σs, σb, σc) =
storeϕ(σ)∧ cE0
Rules(σ,t)−−−−−−→ c∧〈l, v〉 = Reach(Eϕ(σ, t))) =⇒ Π1(c) = nobs(σb, t)∧
Π2(c) = σc ∧ Π3(c) = 〈l, v + t − time(Eϕ(σ, t))〉)”. Let us then prove that for all
σ ∈ tw(Σ),P(σ) holds.
– Induction basis: For σ = , let us consider t ∈ R≥0. Then, Eϕ(, t) = , and
Reach(Eϕ(, t)) = q0 = 〈l0, v0〉. The only rule that can be applied is delay, since
there is not any input, nor any element to dump. Thus, Rules(, t) = / delay(t)/.
Let us consider c ∈ CE such that cE0
Rules(,t)−−−−−−→ c. Then, c = 〈, , 〈l0, v0 + t〉, t〉,
thus, if (σs, σb, σc) = storeϕ(σ) = (, , ), then Π1(c) =  = nobs(σb, t),
Π2(c) =  = σc, and Π3(c) = 〈l0, v0 + t〉 = 〈l0, v0 + t − time()〉. Moreover,
output(σ, t) =  = Eϕ(σ, t). Thus, P() holds.
– Induction step: Let us suppose now that for some σ ∈ tw(Σ), P(σ) holds. Let
us consider (t, a) ∈ R≥0 × Σ such that σ.(t, a) ∈ tw(Σ). Let us then prove that
P(σ.(t, a)) holds. Let us consider t′ ∈ R≥0, c ∈ CE such that cE0
Rules(σ,t)−−−−−−→ c,
(σs, σb, σc) = storeϕ(σ), and (σt, σd, σe) = storeϕ(σ.(t, a)). If t′ < t, then the
rules applied at date t′ with input σ.(t, a) are the same as the ones applied with input
σ, and Eϕ(σ.(t, a), t′) = Eϕ(σ, t′), thus P(σ.(t, a)) holds. Thus, in the following,
we will consider that t′ ≥ t:
• If a ∈ Σu, rule pass-uncont can be applied. Let us consider
c′ = c after((t, a)/pass-uncont((t, a))/(t, a)). Then, c′ = 〈σd, σe, q′, t〉, with
Π3(c)
(t,a)−−−→ q′, since update computes κϕ from Definition 13. Then, obs(σd, t′)
can be dumped, by applying delay followed by dump for each event, followed
by a last delay rule to reach date t′. Thus, if cf = cE0 afterRules(σ.(t, a), t
′),
then Π1(cf ) = nobs(σd, t′) (what remains after having dumped obs(σd, t′)),
Π2(cf ) = σe, since the second member does not change when applying rules
delay and dump, and Π3(cf ) = 〈l, v + t′ − time(σs.(t, a). obs(σd, t′))〉 =
〈l, v+ t′ − time(Eϕ(σ.(t, a)))〉, with 〈l, v〉 = Reach(σs.(t, a). obs(σd, t′)) =
Reach(Eϕ(σ.(t, a))), since Π3(c)
(t,a). obs(σd,t
′)−−−−−−−−−−→ Π3(cf ) and
Π3(c) = Reach(Eϕ(σ, t)). Moreover, output(σ.(t, a), t′) =
σs. obs(σb, t).(t, a). obs(σd, t
′) = output(σ, t).(t, a). obs(σd, t′) =
Eϕ(σ, t).(t, a). obs(σd, t
′) = Eϕ(σ.(t, a), t′). Thus, P(σ.(t, a)) holds.
• If a ∈ Σc, rule store-cont can be applied. Let us consider
c′ = c after((t, a)/ store-cont(a)/). Then, c′ = 〈σd, σe, Π3(c), t〉, and then,
like previously, obs(σd, t′) can be dumped, by using rules dump and delay,
such that, if cf = cE0 afterRules(σ.(t, a), t
′), then Π1(cf ) = nobs(σd, t),
Π2(cf ) = σe, and Π3(cf ) = 〈l, v + t′ − time(σs. obs(σb, t). obs(σd, t′))〉 =
〈l, v + t′ − time(Eϕ(σ.(t, a), t′))〉, with 〈l, v〉 = Reach(Eϕ(σ, t)). Moreover,
output(σ.(t, a), t′) = output(σ, t). obs(σd, t′) = Eϕ(σ.t). obs(σd, t′) =
Eϕ(σ.(t, a), t
′). Thus P(σ.(t, a)) holds.
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Thus, P(σ) =⇒ P(σ.(t, a)).
Thus, by induction, for all σ ∈ tw(Σ),P(σ) holds. In particular, for all σ ∈ tw(Σ),
and for all t ∈ R≥0, output(σ, t) = Eϕ(σ, t), meaning that the output of the enforce-
ment monitor E with input σ at time t is exactly the output of function Eϕ with the same
input and the same date.
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